Constitutional Law—Direct Shipment of Alcohol—Well-Aged and Finally Uncorked: The Supreme Court Decides Whether the Twenty-First Amendment Grants States the Power to Avoid the Dormant Commerce Clause. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005). by Jones, Robert L., III
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 3 Article 5 
2006 
Constitutional Law—Direct Shipment of Alcohol—Well-Aged and 
Finally Uncorked: The Supreme Court Decides Whether the 
Twenty-First Amendment Grants States the Power to Avoid the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 
(2005). 
Robert L. Jones III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert L. Jones III, Constitutional Law—Direct Shipment of Alcohol—Well-Aged and Finally Uncorked: The 
Supreme Court Decides Whether the Twenty-First Amendment Grants States the Power to Avoid the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005)., 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 483 
(2006). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DIRECT SHIPMENT OF ALCOHOL-WELL-
AGED AND FINALLY UNCORKED: THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES
WHETHER THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT GRANTS STATES THE POWER
TO AVOID THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S.
Ct. 1885 (2005).
I. INTRODUCTION
An Arkansas resident visits the San Sebastian Winery in Saint
Augustine, Florida. Upon returning home, he decides that he desires that
bottle of wine he forgot to purchase. Unfortunately, the Arkansas resident
learns that Arkansas, like many other states, bans the direct shipment of out-
of-state wine. This brings up the question: How is this possible?
Alcohol holds a special place within interstate commerce. On any
given day in the United States, numerous interstate, commercial transactions
occur. With the acceptance of the Internet as an avenue of commerce, one
can purchase almost any modern convenience while sitting within one's
home and ship the item to one's front door. Yet, despite the technological
innovations that enable consumers to gain previously unimaginable access
to markets, one item remains off-limits for certain people. That item is alco-
hol.
Fortunately, though, in Granholm v. Heald,' the United States Su-
preme Court recently came to the rescue of those like our hypothetical Ar-
kansas resident.2 There, the Supreme Court weighed in on the direct ship-
ment of wine controversy in favor of the small wineries, wine connoisseurs,
and consumers.3
America's struggle with alcohol stretches far back into the annals of
history.4 This struggle is not unique; in fact, the perception that alcohol is
evil dates at least as far back as the Bible.5 While the merits of the struggle
over whether alcohol is evil are not insignificant, the issue addressed in this
note is whether a state may regulate alcohol, even if the regulation violates
the Dormant Commerce Clause.6
1. 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1907 (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control over
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REv. 161, 165 (1991)
(providing a thorough discussion of the history of alcohol regulation and influence in our
country).
5. See Proverbs 20:1 (King James) ("Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging; and
whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise.").
6. See generally Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
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First, this note sets forth the facts of the Court's decision in Gran-
holm.7 Next, the note focuses on the background upon which the decision
was based. 8 This second section includes the following: a discussion of di-
rect shipment laws, the Commerce Clause, the history of federal regulation
of alcohol-including the Wilson Act, the Webb-Kenyon Act, the Eight-
eenth and Twenty-First Amendments-and the early and modem case law
concerning the intersection of the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First
Amendment. 9 Next, the note reviews the Court's reasoning in Granholm.'l
Finally, the note discusses the impact of the decision, including: an assess-
ment of the effect on Arkansas's direct shipment laws and the three-tiered
system of alcohol regulation."
II. FACTS
The decision in Granholm arose from two separate lawsuits involving
small wine producers "that rely on direct consumer sales as an important
part of their businesses."' 2 State regulations that forbade or severely limited
the direct shipment of wine prevented the wineries from shipping directly to
consumers. 13 The plaintiffs in the first case were wine connoisseurs, wine
journalists, and a small winery in California. 14 They challenged a portion of
Michigan's alcohol distribution regulations as unconstitutional because it
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating between in-state
and out-of-state wineries.' 5 The second action involved three New York
wine consumers and two out-of-state wineries. 16 These plaintiffs challenged
sections of New York's Alcoholic Beverage Control Law ("ABC Law") on
the same grounds as in the Michigan lawsuit. 7
A. The Michigan Lawsuit
Domaine Alfred's California winery received orders for wine from
Michigan consumers. 18 Michigan, like many other states, mandates a three-
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
9. See discussion infra Parts III.A.-D.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1893.
13. Id. at 1891-92.
14. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 2003). See discussion infra Part II.A.
15. Heald, 342 F.3d at 519. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004). See discussion infra Part
II.B.
17. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 229. See discussion infra Part II.B.
18. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1893.
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tiered distribution structure for alcohol sales.' 9 Michigan generally requires
producers of alcoholic beverages to sell only to licensed in-state wholesal-
ers, who, in turn, may sell only to licensed in-state retailers. 20 An exception
exists, however, for Michigan wineries. 21 In-state wineries can apply for
"wine maker" licenses that allow them to ship directly to Michigan consum-
ers.
22
Due to the direct shipment ban, the orders placed to wineries like Al-
fred's remained incomplete.23 Also, Alfred's could not use a Michigan
wholesaler because its winery produced only about 3,000 bottles a year and
the wholesaler's markup would make shipment unprofitable. 24 Even if Al-
fred's found a Michigan wholesaler to distribute the wine, the markup by
the wholesaler would cause shipment via the three-tiered system to be eco-
nomically infeasible. 25 The plaintiffs challenged the Michigan alcohol dis-
tribution system for violating the Commerce Clause because it prohibited
the direct shipment of wine to consumers and yet allowed in-state direct
shipment.26 The State of Michigan defended the system, with help from an
intervening trade association, as a valid exercise of the State's power under
Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment. 27 The State of Michigan ar-
gued that Section Two creates an exception to traditional Commerce Clause
analysis.28 The State's argument rests upon the proposition that the Twenty-
First Amendment removed alcohol distribution from the scope of the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause.29
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
upheld the regulatory scheme, but the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed.30 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Twenty-
First Amendment did not remove all state liquor laws from Commerce
Clause analysis. 31 Applying Dormant Commerce Clause principles, the
Sixth Circuit then held that the Michigan system was unconstitutional be-
19. Id. at 1892.
20. Id. at 1893.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1893.
25. Id. In-state wineries avoid the markup and thereby realize a higher profit margin.
Heald, 342 F.3d at 521. In addition to this markup, an out-of-state winery pays $300 for a
license to sell to a Michigan wholesaler, while an in-state winery pays only $25 for a license
to sell directly to consumers. Id.
26. Heald, 342 F.3d at 519.
27. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1894.
28. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 19, Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) (No.
03-1116).
29. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1894.
30. Id.
31. Id.
2006)
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cause the State failed to show that its policy objectives could not be
achieved by nondiscriminatory means.32 More specifically, the State was
unable to demonstrate that the objectives of protecting minors and collect-
ing tax revenue could be accomplished only by discriminating against out-
of-state wineries.
33
B. The New York Lawsuit
The wineries in the New York dispute involved the Swedenburg Estate
Vineyard in Virginia and the Lucas Winery in California.34 These wineries
typically attracted tourists who often wished to purchase wine once they
returned home. 35 Like Michigan, New York has legally instituted the three-
tiered distribution model for alcohol production and sales.36 Once again like
Michigan, the New York statutory scheme required an exception from the
three-tiered system for in-state wineries.37 If such a winery produced wine
only from New York grapes, the winery could apply for a license to sell and
ship directly to in-state consumers. 38 The wineries holding these licenses
also were permitted to deliver wines from other wineries provided that sev-
enty-five percent of the volume of the grapes used by the other wineries
came from New York grapes. 39 New York also allowed an out-of-state win-
ery to ship directly to New York consumers by becoming a licensed New
York winery.40 To achieve this status, however, the winery had to establish
a "branch factory, office, or storeroom within the state of New York."
'
Thus, the New York scheme required two hurdles-first, the use of New
York grapes and second, a physical presence in New York.
Due to New York's distribution scheme, the Swedenburg and Lucas
wineries were unable to fill orders from that state, the nation's second larg-
est wine market.43 The plaintiffs sued seeking a declaration that the system
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.44 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the
32. Id.
33. Heald, 342 F.3d. at 527.
34. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1893.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1892.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1894.
39. Id.
40. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1894.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1893.
44. Id. at 1894.
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plaintiffs.45 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed.46 The Second Circuit found that the New York regulations were
within the powers granted to the states by the Twenty-First Amendment.47
The Supreme Court consolidated the Michigan and New York cases to
answer whether a "[s]tate's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries
to directly ship" wine while restricting out-of-state wineries from doing so
violates the Dormant Commerce Clause in light of Section Two of the
Twenty-First Amendment. 48 The similarities between the two systems en-
abled the Court to consider them together to answer the question.49 Both
systems discriminated against out-of-state wineries in favor of in-state win-
eries.50 The difference between New York and Michigan's systems is that
New York's system theoretically allowed an out-of-state winery to apply for
a license while Michigan's system did not. 51 Yet, not a single out-of-state
winery successfully obtained a license under the New York scheme.52 The
next section involves a discussion of the historical background behind the
dispute over the direct shipment of wine.53
III. BACKGROUND
This section traces the historical foundations underlying the contro-
versy over the direct shipment of wine to consumers that the Supreme Court
recently decided in Granholm. First, the section will provide a brief over-
view of direct shipment laws enacted by the States.5 4 Second, the section
will examine the Commerce Clause.55 Third, the section will analyze the
history of the Twenty-First Amendment. 56 Finally, the section will discuss
the interaction of the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment
in light of the shipment of liquor directly to consumers.57
45. Id.
46. Granholm, 125 S.Ct. at 1894.
47. Id. at 1894-95.
48. Id. at 1895.
49. See discussion supra Part II.A.-B.
50. See discussion supra Part II.A.-B.
51. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1896.
52. Id. at 1897.
53. See discussion infra Part III.
54. See discussion infra Part III.A.
55. See discussion infra Part III.B.
56. See discussion infra Part III.C.
57. See discussion infra Part III.D.
20061
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A. Direct Shipment Laws
The existence of direct shipment laws dates back decades, at least as
far back as the period following Prohibition.5 8 The function of these laws is
to restrict the shipment of alcoholic beverages directly from out-of-state
producers and retailers to in-state consumers. 59 States created a three-tiered
system for regulating alcohol following the repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment-the constitutional amendment instituting prohibition of alco-
hol. 60 The three-tiered system requires a producer to sell to a distributor,
who in turn must sell to a retailer, who then sells to the consumer.61 All fifty
states regulate the sale of alcohol in some form.62 State laws generally fall
into three categories: reciprocity states, limited shipment states, and anti-
direct shipment states. 63 Twenty-three states ban the direct shipment of al-
cohol to consumers; fifteen have limited shipment regulations; and thirteen
states are considered reciprocal states.64 The number of states in each cate-
gory appears to fluctuate considering that in the last eighteen years, forty-
three states have considered over 160 bills proposing changes to their direct
shipment laws.65
58. Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, the Commerce Clause, and the
Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REv. 353, 355 (1999).
59. Id.
60. Louisa Thomas Hargrave, Let It Flow, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at 13; Stephen
Meuse, Decision Clarifies, Clouds Wine World, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 2005, at E3. See
also Shanker, supra note 57, at 355; Lucas, infra note 83, at 902.
61. Shanker, supra note 58, at 355; Meuse, supra note 59. The United States Supreme
Court recognized the three-tier system as "unquestionably legitimate" in North Dakota v.
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990). Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905.
62. James Molnar, Comment, Under the Influence: Why Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws
are a Violation of the Commerce Clause, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 169, 172 (2001); see also
Hargrave, supra note 59, at 13.
63. Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Com-
merce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1648-49 (2000). Generally, limited ship-
ment states limit the amount of direct shipments to consumers, reciprocal states allow direct
shipment from states that have similar or reciprocal provisions allowing direct shipment, and
anti-direct shipment states ban direct shipment. Id. at nn. 134-36. Also, see id. for a discus-
sion, comprehensive listing, and analysis of the different wine statutes.
64. Wine Institute, Direct Shipment Laws by State for Wineries, State Shipping Laws,
http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/ (last visited June 11, 2005). Arkansas is included in
the category of states that ban direct shipments of wine. Id.
Also, Arkansas's neighboring state of Texas recently passed legislation allowing for direct
shipment of wine throughout their state. See Wine Institute, Texas Opens Direct to Consumer
Wine Sales, http://www.wineinstitute.org/communications/statistics/texasbillsigned2005.htm
(last visited June 11, 2005).
65. Gina M.Riekhof & Michael E. Sykuta, Politics, Economics, and the Regulation of
Direct Interstate Shipping in the Wine Industry, 87 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 439 (2005).
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66Arkansas is representative of the direct shipment states. Arkansas
bars the direct shipment of alcohol from outside of the state unless the wine-
maker first obtained a permit or paid an excise tax. 67 An exception to requir-
ing a permit is created for Arkansas wine.68 Recently, Arkansas enacted Act
1806 of 2005, which is an outright direct shipment law.69 The Act specifi-
cally addresses direct shipping.70 It allows Arkansas consumers visiting in-
state wineries to directly ship wine. 71 The Act does not address Arkansas
residents who visit out-of-state wineries.72 The statute also repeals a portion
of the Arkansas Code that banned direct shipment by Arkansas wineries to
73in-state consumers.
States generally offer two rationales for prohibiting the direct shipment
of alcohol to consumers.74 First, such bans better enable states to collect tax
revenue from alcohol sales.75 Currently, "unless the vendor has a 'substan-
tial nexus' with the state, a state cannot require an out-of-state vendor to
collect sales taxes., 76 Second, "restrictions on mail-order and Internet sales
will prevent minors from obtaining access to alcohol. 77 The proponents of
direct shipment bans argue that direct shipment will allow minors to avoid
state laws preventing the sale of alcohol to minors.78
While it is questionable whether direct shipment prohibitions actually
serve their stated purposes of enhancing tax collection and reducing con-
sumption by minors, there is no doubt that such laws prevent small wineries
66. Id.
67. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 3-7-106(a)(1), 3-3-216 (Michie 1987); Arkansas's direct ship-
ment ban reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to ship or transport or cause to be shipped or
transported into the State of Arkansas any spirituous liquors, vinous liquors,
wines other than Arkansas wines, or beer or malt beverages from points without
the state without first having obtained a permit from the Director of the Alco-
holic Beverage Control Division.
Id. § 3-7-106(a)(1). "It shall be unlawful for any person to buy, bargain, sell, loan, own, have
in possession, or knowingly transport in this state any intoxicating liquor of any kind upon
which the Arkansas excise tax prescribed by law has not been paid." Id. § 3-3-216.
68. ARK.CODE ANN. § 3-7-106(a)(1) (Michie 1987).
69. 2005 Ark. Acts 1806.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Shanker, supra note 58, at 357.
75. Id. Transactions that go through the three-tier system are subject to a sales tax at the
wholesale tier, while out-of-state suppliers who ship directly to consumers avoid charging
sales tax. Id.
76. Id. (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992)).
77. Id. Also, a poll by Americans for Responsible Alcohol Access suggested 85% of
Americans believe direct shipments would allow easier access for minors. Id.
78. Douglass, supra note 63, at 1652 n.138.
2006] 489
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from effectively accessing certain markets. 79 This problem is due to con-
solidation in the liquor distributing industry.80 Some small wineries are un-
able to meet certain levels of production or volume required by many dis-
tributors, and, thus, they would prefer to ship directly to consumers.81 The
advent of e-commerce makes this method of distribution especially appeal-
ing to small wineries.
82
B. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power...
to regulate Commerce . . . among the several states. 83 This clause grants
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 84 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court held in Cooley v. Board of Wardens8 5 that the Commerce
Clause also incorporates an implicit restraint on state power even in the
absence of congressional action-this restraint is known as the "Dormant
Commerce Clause." 86 The primary purpose of the Commerce Clause-
including the Dormant Commerce Clause-is to ensure the free flow of
trade between the States.87 When addressing the propriety of a state law
under a current Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Court first exam-
ines "whether [the statute] regulates evenhandedly with only incidental ef-
fects on interstate commerce. 88 Second, even if there is a legitimate pur-
pose, a statute that discriminates against interstate or out-of-state commerce
is per se invalid.89 Finally, courts will strike down a nondiscriminatory stat-
ute if "the burden it imposes on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in
79. 145 CONG. REC. 19193 (1999). Representative Thompson listed the obstacles facing
small wineries. He also pointed out that in 1999 there were 2,000 small wineries as opposed
to 375 in 1963. Id.
80. Id. Representative Thompson pointed out that in 1963 there were 10,900 distribu-
tors, but by 1999 there were only 300 distributors. Id.
81. Molnar, supra note 62, at 173.
82. Id. at 172.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
84. See id; see also Lisa Lucas, Comment, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Recon-
ciling the Twenty-First Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 899, 911
(2005).
85. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
86. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, at 1030 (3d ed. 2000).
This restraint has been interpreted for at least 140 years, beginning with Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852). Nevertheless, it is possible that the dormant Com-
merce Clause really began with Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824). See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIEs 311-12 (Aspen Law & Business 1997).
87. Lucas, supra note 84, at 910-11.
88. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't. of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
89. Id.; See TRIBE, supra note 86 § 6-5, at 1050.
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relation to the putative local benefits." 90 The Twenty-First Amendment al-
ters the traditional Dormant Commerce Clause analysis in cases dealing
with state alcoholic beverage regulation. 9' It is to that Amendment, and the
United States' experience with alcohol regulation, that this note now turns.
92
C. A Brief History of Federal Regulation of Alcohol Distribution and
Consumption
There have been three phases of federal regulation of alcohol: pre-
Prohibition, Prohibition, and post-Prohibition.93 Pre-Prohibition includes the
early case law, the Wilson Act of 1890, and the Webb-Kenyon Act of
1913.94 The Eighteenth Amendment marks the beginning of the era of Pro-
hibition. 95 The ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment marks the be-
ginning of the post-Prohibition era.
96
1. Pre-Prohibition
a. Early case law and history
As the Supreme Court has explained, "the history of state regulation of
alcoholic beverages dates from long before adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment., 97 In fact, the American temperance movement began in the
1800s.98 The country's struggle with alcohol largely began on a local level,
and the regulation of alcohol was primarily a state-by-state affair.99 The first
challenge to a state's regulation of alcohol under the Dormant Commerce
Clause claims came in 1847.100 The case, Thurlow v. Massachusetts,101 con-
90. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99; see also TRIBE, supra note 86 § 6-5, at
1050.
91. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.b.
92. See discussion infra Part III.C.
93. See discussion infra Part III.C.
94. See discussion infra Part III.C. 1.a.-c.
95. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
96. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
97. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205 (1976).
98. Spaeth, supra note 4, at 165. "The first successful political movement.., began in
1826 with the founding of the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance, better
known as the American Temperance Society (ATS)." Id. at 168. Eventually, the temperance
movement was advanced "by the formidable Anti-Saloon League (ASL), a federation of
churches and temperance societies" including "large Protestant denominations[:] namely,
Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, and Scandinavian Lutherans." Id. at 170 n.55.
99. Russ Miller, Note, The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-First Amendment and State
Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2495, 2496-97
(2001).
100. Id at 2503-04.
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cemed three state statutes enacted by Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
New Hampshire that required citizens to obtain a license to sell alcohol
within their respective borders. 102 Thurlow incorporated challenges to all
three state statutes, and the cases, commonly known as "License Cases,"
were argued together.10 3 In the License Cases, 10 4 the Court recognized that
state governments possess broad authority to regulate the trade of alcoholic
beverages within their borders free from implied restrictions under the
Commerce Clause.
0 5
Prior to the next Commerce Clause challenge, the temperance move-
ment gained an important victory in the fight to ban liquor in Mugler v.
Kansas, °6 which the Court decided in 1887.°7 The case concerned a Kan-
sas constitutional amendment prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor
within the state.'0 8 The Court found that such a restriction was within the
State's police power.' 0 9 Importantly, Mugler did not involve Commerce
Clause principles; thus, the Court did not reach that issue."0
The next Commerce Clause challenge came in Bowman v. Chicago
and Northwestern Railway Co.,111 which involved an Iowa statute requiring
permits for the importing of liquor. 12 In Bowman, the Court held that the
permit statute violated the Dormant Commerce Clause,' 13 despite the fact
that the law was an exercise of Iowa's police power intended to protect its
citizens from the effects of alcohol. 1 4 The Court explained that the statute
was beyond the police power because there was a difference between "the
right of the state to restrict or prohibit sales of intoxicating liquor within its
limits" and "the right to prohibit its importation."" 1 5 The Court concluded
101. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
102. Miller, supra note 99, at 2503.
103. Id. at 2503 n.50.
104. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
105. Miller, supra note 99, at 2503-04 (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 205). Chief Justice
Taney stated in Thurlow that "the power of Congress over [commerce] does not extend fur-
ther than the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States; ...
beyond these limits the States have never surrendered their power over trade and commerce,
and may still exercise it ... " See Richard H. Seamon, Note, The Market Participant Test in
Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis-Protecting Protectionism?, 1985 DUKE L.J. 697, n. 15
(1985) (citing Thurlow, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 504, 574).
106. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
107. Miller, supra note 99, at 2504.
108. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 624.
109. Id. at 661-63.
110. See generally id.
111. 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
112. Id. at 474.
113. Id. at 499-500.
114. Id. at 476.
115. Id. at 498-99.
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that the former was a legitimate exercise of the police power, while the lat-
ter was not. 16 The Court in Bowman ruled that alcohol must arrive in the
state before it is subject to local regulation."l 7 In other words, physical
transportation must end before the state may exercise its police power, even
though the state may ban the consumption and distribution of liquor entirely
once it arrived."i8 The Court justified this limitation on state power to regu-
late liquor by relying on the Commerce Clause, under which regulation of
interstate commerce is the exclusive domain of Congress. 1
9
The next alcohol regulation case to reach the Supreme Court was Leisy
v. Hardin.120 In Leisy, the Court allowed the importation of liquor provided
it was in its original packaging.'12 In Leisy, the authorities seized a shipment
of beer in Iowa upon shipment from Illinois. 22 Iowa had recently passed a
law prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors in the state
with few exceptions. 23 The Court found this to be in conflict with the
Commerce Clause and held that the beer could be shipped into Iowa and
then reshipped by the recipient as long as it remained in the original packag-
ing. 124 Thus, Leisy presented a dilemma for the states. 125 They could ban the
production of domestic liquor; but, they were unable to bar out-of-state liq-
uor as long as it remained in its original package. 26
b. The Wilson Act of 1890
Following Leisy, Congress enacted the Wilson Act of 1890,127 which
resolved the Leisy dilemma and provided that keeping alcohol in its original
116. Id. at 499.
117. Bowman, 125 U.S. at 499.
118. Id.; see Spaeth, supra note 4, at 171.
119. Bowman, 125 U.S. at 499.
120. 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
121. Miller, supra note 99, at 2506 (citing Leisy, 135 U.S. at 124).
122. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 100-01.
123. Id. at 104-05.
124. Id. at 124.
125. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1898.
126. Id.
127. Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000). The Wilson Act reads:
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into
any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage
therein, shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation
and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its po-
lice powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or
liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt
there from by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or other-
wise.
2006]
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packaging would not exempt it from state regulation. 28 More specifically,
the Wilson Act tied alcohol transported into a state to the laws and regula-
tions of that state to the same extent and in the same manner as the alcohol
produced in that state.129 While the Wilson Act corrected the "original pack-
aging" problem, the alcohol industry soon discovered another loophole.
In 1898, the Supreme Court declared that the Wilson Act, and, thereby,
state regulations, did not apply until the liquor was actually received by the
local recipient.130 The laws of a state did not take effect until the shipping
assignee received the shipment of alcohol.13 ' Thus, a state's ban on the sale
of alcohol did not attach until after the alcohol was delivered in the state.
132
Accordingly, directly shipping alcohol to the end-user avoided the state and
local regulations because the state regulations attached only after deliv-
ery.
t33
c. The Webb-Kenyon Act
In response to the loophole under the Wilson Act, Congress enacted
the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913. 3 That statute extended the Wilson Act by
permitting states to regulate in-state liquor sales to "any person interested
therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used."'135 This
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 426 (1898).
131. Id. at421-23.
132. Id.
133. 49 CONG. REc. 761 (1912). Senator Kenyon of Iowa observed the following prob-
lem:
Every State in which the traffic in liquors has been prohibited by law is deluged
with whisky sent in by people from other States under the shelter of the inter-
state-commerce law. There are daily trainloads of liquors in bottles, jugs, and
other packages sent into the State consigned to persons, real and fictitious, and
every railway station and every express company office in the State are con-
verted into the most extensive and active whisky shops, from which whisky is
openly distributed in great quantities. Liquor dealers in other States secure the
names of all persons in a community, and through the mails flood them with ad-
vertisements of whisky, with the most liberal and attractive propositions for the
sale and shipment of the same. Freed from the expense of the middleman, the
distiller or dealer in other States is enabled to sell to the individual in the prohi-
bition State at a less price than the purchaser formerly paid to the domestic
whisky dealer. It is evident that under such circumstances the prohibition law of
a State is practically nullified, and intoxicating liquors are imposed upon its peo-
ple against the will of the majority.
Id.
134. Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2000).
135. Id.; Scott F. Mascianica, Student Article, Why All the Wine-ing? The Wine Indus-
try's Battle with States over the Direct Shipment Issue, 17 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 91, 95
(2004).
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effectively barred the importation and transportation of any alcohol into a
state by anyone who intended to use the product in any way that violated the
state's laws.' 36 It should be noted that the Webb-Kenyon Act, unlike the
Wilson Act, contained no language relating to the prevention of discrimina-
tion. 137 The Wilson Act provided that liquor shipped into the state would be
subject to local laws to the same extent and in the same manner as the liquor
produced in the state.'38 But, the Webb-Kenyon Act had no comparable
language.
139
In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co.,140 the Supreme
Court interpreted the Webb-Kenyon Act rather narrowly, explaining that the
statute was merely intended to extend the Wilson Act of 1917.' 1 The Court
effectively read the Wilson Act's discriminatory language into the Webb-
Kenyon Act. 142 The Wilson Act provided that states could regulate out of
state alcohol "to the same extent and in the same manner as though such...
liquors had been produced in such State."'143 The Court in Clark Distilling
Co. recognized that the purpose of the Webb-Kenyon Act was to "prevent
the immunity characteristic of interstate commerce ... [and] to permit the
receipt of liquor through such commerce in States contrary to their laws."'
44
The Webb-Kenyon Act removed all receipt and possession of liquor prohib-
ited by state law from the protection of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
45
136. Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars-Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Consumers'Rights, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 12 (2000).
137. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1912 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Webb-Kenyon Act reads
as follows:
[t]he shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of
any spiritous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any kind
from one State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontigu-
ous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, into any other State, Territory, or
District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the juris-
diction thereof, or from any foreign country into any State, Territory, or District
of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, which said spiritous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating
liquor is intended, by any person interested therein, to be received, possessed,
sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in viola-
tion of any law of such State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place
noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is prohibited.
27 U.S.C. § 122 (200).
138. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1912.
139. Id.
140. 242U.S. 311 (1917).
141. Id. at 323-24; see Miller, supra note 99, at n. 112.
142. See Clark Distillery Co., 242 U.S. at 324.
143. Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000).
144. Clark Distilling Co., 242 U.S. at 324.
145. See id. at 325.
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This removal resulted in immunity for alcohol from Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 146
The Court's interpretation in Clark Distilling Co. is consistent with the
legislative history surrounding the Webb-Kenyon Act.147 Senator Webb, one
of the drafters of the Act, explained during the debate over passage that
those in favor of the Act were asking "to deprive liquors ... of interstate
commerce character, and let [the states] deal with such imported liquors as.
. liquors of domestic production."'
' 48
2. Prohibition
The Eighteenth Amendment, 149 ratified on January 16, 1919, began the
period commonly known as "Prohibition.', 150 The Constitution completely
prohibited liquor distribution, consumption, and production until the repeal
of the Eighteenth Amendment by the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933.15
The Eighteenth Amendment was largely unsuccessful and, in many
ways, undesirable. 52 With the arrival of the Great Depression, the public
opinion of Prohibition began to wither. 53 Most people thought economic
benefits could be achieved through the revenues that could be raised by
taxation of alcohol. 154 As the unemployment numbers increased, resentment
146. See id.
147. 49 CONG. REc. 2913 (1913). Senator Kenyon stated that the purpose of the Wilson
Act was for states to "have prohibition, high license, local option, or free liquor, as they
please." Id. "It was the intention that each State should be free to determine its own policy in
regard to liquor traffic." 49 CONG. REc. 828 (1912); see also Miller, supra note 99, at 2511
n.113.
148. 49 CONG. REc. 2912-13 (1913). The Webb-Kenyon Act originally was vetoed by
President Taft. Nevertheless, Congress passed the Act over the presidential veto. 49 CONG.
REc. 4257, 4291 (1913).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). The text reads as follows:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture,
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into,
or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. Section 2. The
Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this arti-
cle by appropriate legislation. Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless
it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legisla-
tures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years
from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, §§ 1-3 (repealed 1933).
150. Marc Aaron Melzer, Comment, A Vintage Conflict Uncorked: The Twenty-first
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Fully-Ripened Fight over Interstate Wine and
Liquor Sales, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 279, 279 (2004).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
152. Spaeth, supra note 4, at 179-80.
153. Id. at 179.
154. Id
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of the salaries that the revenue agents received began to grow. 5 The com-
bination of these two factors pushed "the consensus of public opinion to-
ward the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment." 56 The dismal experience
with Prohibition under federal control contributed to both Congress's and
the states' insistence on state control of liquor upon repeal. 57 In fact, upon
the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress reenacted the Webb-
Kenyon Act in 1935, exactly as it existed prior to the Eighteenth Amend-
ment. 58 The Webb-Kenyon Act removed all receipt and possession of liq-
uor prohibited by state law from the protection of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 1
59
3. Post-Prohibition: The Meaning of Section Two
With the Eighteenth Amendment's popularity failing, the people rati-
fied the Twenty-First Amendment with three sections. 160 Section One spe-
cifically repeals the Eighteenth Amendment, and Section Three provides a
time limitation for ratification.' 6' Section Two provides a prohibition of the
transportation or importation of alcohol if it is contrary to state law, but
many questions surround the scope and meaning of Section Two.
162
In construing Section Two's meaning, the United States Supreme
Court initially found that the plain meaning of the words was an appropriate
starting point. 63 To ascertain the plain meaning requires a textual analysis
of the words of the Twenty-First Amendment. 64 Such an analysis requires
155. Id. at 179-80.
156. Id. at 180.
157. Id.
158. See Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 740 § 2020(b), 49 Stat. 877 (1935).
159. Clark Distillery Co., 242 U.S. at 325. See discussion supra Part III.C. 1 .c.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The text reads as follows:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
States is hereby repealed. Section 2. The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. Sec-
tion 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided
in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to
the States by the Congress.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §§ 1-3.
161. Id. at §§ 1, 3.
162. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
163. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63-64
(1936) (declining to look beyond the text of the Twenty-First Amendment because "the
language of the Amendment is clear" and "the Amendment has, in respect to liquor, freed the
States from all restrictions upon the police power to be found in other provisions of the Con-
stitution").
164. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816) ("The words are to
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consideration of the words in context. 6 The text can be read to give states a
complete exemption from the Commerce Clause, o'r it can be read to allow
states only to regulate without violating the Commerce Clause. 166 Unfortu-
nately, this approach presents no clear answer regarding whether Congress
and the states intended Section Two to remove the regulation of liquor from
the reach of the Commerce Clause or any other constitutional provisions.1
67
Despite the lack of a clear answer from the text, the Court initially felt that
the language of Section Two was sufficiently clear to avoid resorting to the
history of the Amendment. 168
Even though the language of Section Two at first appeared clear to the
Court, the Court's approach to interpretation based on plain meaning is in-
consistent with tradition. 69 The Supreme Court's "traditional" approach to
statutory interpretation includes consideration of contextual evidence, even
when the text has an apparent "plain meaning."' 70 The contextual evidence
includes legislative history and the text itself.171 Congress proposed the
Twenty-First Amendment, and the state conventions ratified the Amend-
ment without much debate.
172
The legislative history, however, offers some guidance to understand-
ing the purpose as initially understood by the Court. 173 Although the history
of Senate Joint Resolution 211, which eventually would become the
Twenty-First Amendment, provides no clear answer as to Section Two's
meaning, 74 both the Senate and the House of Representatives understood
be taken in their natural and obvious sense, and not in a sense unreasonably restricted or
enlarged.").
165. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (looking at only the bare words of
a constitutional amendment "overlooks the cardinal rule to construe provisions in context").
166. Douglass, supra note 63, at 1648-49.
167. See id.
168. Young's Mkt., 299 U.S. at 64. The Court stated that "we think the language of the
amendment is clear." Id. at 63-64.
169. Rebecca L. Spiro, Note, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Rhenquist Court:
Theories of Statutory Interpretation, 37 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 103, 106 (2000). See also Stephen
Breyer, Of the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845
(1992) (discussing the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation).
170. Spiro, supra note 169, at 106. Given that the Granholm decision considered the
legislative history of the Twenty-First Amendment, it is intriguing that Justice Scalia sided
with the majority given his propensity to eschew legislative history. Id. Scalia's jurispru-
dence aligns him with the textualism of the earlier Court's grant of broad powers to the
States. Id.
171. Id.
172. Douglass, supra note 63, at 1631-32. Nevertheless, the initial proposal, Senate Joint
Resolution 211, received a substantial amount of debate over the "concurrent powers" sec-
tion. Miller, supra note 98, at 2512-13.
173. See generally 76 CONG. REc. 4138-79 (1933).
174. 76 CONG. REc. 4138 (1933). The initial proposed resolution mirrored the Twenty-
first Amendment exactly as it exists today. Of interest to Arkansans, Senator Joe Robinson of
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Senate Joint Resolution 211 as protecting the dry states. 75 Congress under-
stood Senate Joint Resolution 211 as turning absolute control over interstate
commerce in regards to alcohol to the states.' 76 Congress, however, ap-
peared to focus more on the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment than the
implications of Section Two. 177 The legislative history provides some evi-
dence that Section Two was added to remove the regulation of liquor from a
Commerce Clause analysis.
178
D. The Intersection of the Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce
Clause
A unique relationship between the Twenty-First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause evolved after the latter's ratification. This section traces
the developments of the case law following that ratification. This section
begins with a discussion of the early interpretations of the Twenty-First
Amendment in light of the Commerce Clause.1 79 Next, this section exam-
ines the modem case law.1
80
1. State's Power Under the Twenty-First Amendment Peaks
Following the passage of the Twenty-First Amendment, in a series of
five cases, the Court read the Twenty-First Amendment as a broad grant of
power to the states over the regulation of intoxicating liquor' 8 ' In State
Board of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co.,'82 the Court
found that the words of the Twenty-First Amendment "are apt to confer
Arkansas proposed the Amendment to the resolution striking Section Two entirely as well as
a section granting concurrent power to Congress and the states. Ultimately, his motion to
amend did not pass with regard to Section Two but did pass as to the concurrent powers
section. Id. at 4138-39, 4171, 4179.
175. Id. at 4171. Senator Robinson's statements summarizing the Bill to other representa-
tives show that the perception of Section Two was that it was a protection for dry states after
the repeal of prohibition. Id.
176. 76 CONG. REc. 4143 (1933). "Senator Blaine stated that the purpose was to restore
to the States ... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating
liquor." Miller, supra note 98, at n.130.
177. Spaeth, supra note 4, at 180.
178. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1984) ("[W]e have recog-
nized the obscurity of the legislative history of § 2. No clear consensus concerning the mean-
ing of the provision is apparent.") (citation omitted)).
179. See discussion infra Part III.D.I.
180. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
181. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 137 (1944); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick,
305 U.S. 395, 397 (1939); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938); Zif-
frin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939); State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
182. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
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upon the state the power to forbid all importations which do not comply
with the conditions which it prescribes. 1 83 The Court rejected the idea that
a state must allow imported liquor to compete with domestic liquor on equal
terms if it allows in-state liquor to be sold to consumers.1 84 In Joseph S.
Finch & Co. v. McKittrick,185 the Court held that such an argument consti-
tuted a rewriting of the Amendment rather than a mere construction of the
text.' 86 The Court also emphasized that the Dormant Commerce Clause did
not apply to alcohol regulation. 1
87
In Carter v. Virginia, 88 the Court again held that the broad powers of
the Twenty-First Amendment, allowing states to regulate the importation of
liquor, were not limited by the Commerce Clause. 89 "The Twenty-[F]irst
Amendment placed liquor in a [different category] from other articles of
commerce." 190 Furthermore, despite the fact that the precise amount of
power left in Congress to regulate liquor under the Commerce Clause was
unclear, the Court stated that "local, not national, regulation of... liquor..
is now the general Constitutional policy."'
19 1
183. Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 62. In Young's Market, the issue was the constitution-
ality of a California license fee for the privilege of importing beer into the state. See id. at 60.
Before the Twenty-First Amendment, the fee would have been unconstitutional. Id. at 62.
The fee would have been void because the fee would have caused a direct burden on inter-
state commerce. Id. The Commerce Clause grants the right to import merchandise without
restrictions into any state, except as Congress may require. Id.
184. Id. at 62.
185. 305 U.S. 395 (1939).
186. Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 62.
187. Joseph S. Finch & Co., 305 U.S. at 398. In Joseph S. Finch & Co., a Missouri stat-
ute prevented the importation or transportation into the state of any alcoholic beverage manu-
factured in a state in which discrimination existed against Missouri alcohol. Id. at 396. The
Court held that the Twenty-first Amendment removed alcohol from Commerce Clause pro-
tection. Id. at 398; See also Ziffrin Inc., 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) (The Twenty-first
Amendment sanctions the right of a State to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought
from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause); Joseph S. Finch & Co., 305 U.S. at 397;
Mahoney, 304 U.S. at 403.
188. 321 U.S. 131 (1944). Carter involved two cases. The first case involved two men,
Carter and Macemore, who received 168 gallons of whiskey from a wholesaler in Maryland
and drove it via truck through Virginia to deliver it to Thomasville, North Carolina. Id. at
134. The second case involved Dickerson, who was arrested with more than one gallon of
alcohol while driving through Virginia from Maryland to North Carolina. Id. at 134.
189. Id. at 137.
190. Id. at 138 (Black, J., concurring).
191. Id. The Court clarified the extent of congressional authority to regulate liquor in
William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam). The lawsuit in
Morgenthau arose when the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA) refused to allow
the distributor to import a shipment of blended Scotch whiskey because of improper labeling.
Id. at 172. In that case, the Court found that the FAAA did not violate the Twenty-First
Amendment. Id. at 172-73. The Court stated that
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Also, in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 192 the Court found that states may de-
cide not to consider liquor as an article of interstate commerce.193 In Ziffrin,
the Court upheld a comprehensive Kentucky statute by deciding that "the
State may protect her people against evil incident to intoxicants and may
exercise large discretion as to means employed."'' 94 According to Justice
Jackson's concurrence in Duckworth v. Arkansas,195 "[i]f the Twenty-[F]irst
Amendment is not to be resorted to for the decision of liquor cases, it is on
the way to becoming another 'almost forgotten' clause of the Constitu-
tion. 1 96 The Twenty-First Amendment gives the states broad power to
regulate liquor in such a manner. 197 In fact, the Court initially confirmed the
view that the Twenty-First Amendment primarily created an exception to
the normal operation of the Commerce Clause. 98
2. Supreme Court Begins to Put a Cork in the States' Power to
Regulate Liquor
The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Section Two did not last
for long. This section discusses the beginning of the Court's interpretative
change regarding the relationship between the Twenty-First Amendment
and the Commerce Clause. First, this section follows the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Twenty-First Amendment in light of other constitutional provi-
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act was attacked upon the ground that the
Twenty-[F]irst Amendment to the Federal Constitution gives to the States com-
plete and exclusive control over commerce in intoxicating liquors, unlimited by
the commerce clause, and hence that Congress has no longer authority to control
the importation of these commodities into the United States. We see no sub-
stance in this contention.
Id. at 173.
192. 308 U.S. 132 (1939). Ziffrin involved a Kentucky requirement of a permit for liquor
to pass through its borders. Id. at 135-36. The Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment
granted Kentucky the right to regulate liquor despite the Commerce Clause implications. Id.
at 138.
193. Id. at 140.
194. Id. at 138-39 (citation omitted).
195. 314 U.S. 390 (1941). In Duckworth the state required a permit from the Commis-
sioner of Revenue to transport liquor through the state of Arkansas. Id. at 391.
196. Id. at 399 (Jackson, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 398.
198. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964). The
Court made it clear during the years immediately after ratification of the Twenty-First
Amendment that "a State is totally unconfined by traditional Commerce Clause limitations
when it restricts the importation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or consumption
within its borders." Id.
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sions.' 99 Then, this section turns to the Court's creation of the "core con-
cers" test.200 Finally, this section outlines the recent federal legislation.
20 1
a. The Supreme Court defines the Twenty-First Amendment's
power in relation to other constitutional provisions
The Court gradually changed positions and began to chip away at the
power of the states to regulate liquor under the Twenty-First Amendment.20 2
The Twenty-First Amendment was subjected to a continually narrowing
construction.20 3 In 1964 the Court began to restrict state power under the
Twenty-First Amendment in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp.204 In Hostetter, the Court stated that the Twenty-First Amendment
and the Commerce Clause exist as part of the same Constitution and require
joint consideration.20 5 The Supreme Court limited state power under the
Twenty-First Amendment with respect to the Equal Protection Clause,20 6 the
First Amendment,20 7 the Sherman Antitrust Act,208 and the Federal Commu-
nications Commission regulations of cable television.20 9 Nevertheless, the
Court did not apply this kind of limitation of state power to the Commerce
199. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.a.
200. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.b.
201. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.c.
202. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (refusing to allow the Twenty-
First Amendment to be given greater weight than the Equal Protection Clause); Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964) (recognizing that the Commerce
Clause was not repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (conceding that Congress still retained power
to regulate liquor under the Sherman Act despite the Twenty-First Amendment); Capital
Cities Cable, Inc v. Crisp., 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (identifying that regulations of the Federal
Communications Commission outweighed state concerns under the Twenty-First Amend-
ment); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (balancing the Twenty-First
Amendment and the Commerce Clause); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996) (declining to allow First Amendment to be trumped by the Twenty-First Amend-
ment).
203. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 1169.
204. 377 U.S. 324 (1964). In Hostetter, the Court found that in-state sales of intoxicating
liquor intended to be used only in foreign countries could be made under the supervision of
the Federal Bureau of Customs. Id. at 333-34. The state regulation was not aimed at prevent-
ing unlawful use of alcoholic beverages within the state, but rather was designed "totally to
prevent transactions carried on under the aegis of a law passed by Congress in the exercise of
its explicit power under the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations." Id.
205. See Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332. The Court rejected the idea that the Twenty-First
Amendment has somehow operated to repeal the Commerce Clause where the regulation of
liquor is concerned. Id. at 331.
206. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
207. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
208. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
209. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
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Clause until 1984, despite the Court's earlier statement in Hostetter that
they were both part of the same Constitution.21°
For instance, in Craig v. Boren211 the Court held that the Twenty-First
Amendment did not save a statute from an equal protection challenge.
212
The Court noted that where the Twenty-First Amendment ventures outside
of the sphere of the Commerce Clause, the implications of the Amend-
ment's relevance "to other constitutional provisions becomes increasingly
doubtful., 213 The Court, emphasizing language from Hostetter, stated that
the Twenty-First Amendment did not operate as a pro tanto repeal of the
Commerce Clause; rather, each provision must be considered in light of the
other.214 Additionally, the Court found that the wording of Section Two of
the Twenty-First Amendment closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wil-
son Acts.215
Another example of the Court's shift in analysis is California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass 'n v. MidCal Aluminum, Inc.216 The Court found in that
case that the terms of Section Two did not free the states from the restric-
tions of the federal police power found in other provisions of the Constitu-
tion.21 7 While subsequent decisions gave substantial deference to state liq-
uor regulation, important federal interests survived the ratification of the
Twenty-First Amendment.21 8 Despite the grant of power to the states under
Section Two and the lack of a bright-line test, the federal government still
retained some Commerce Clause power over alcohol.219 "The Twenty-
[F]irst Amendment gran[ted] the states virtually complete control over
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liq-
210. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
211. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Craig involved an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of
non-intoxicating 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to females under the
age of eighteen. Id. at 191-92. The question for the Court was whether this statute violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 192. The Court found that the statute invidiously discrimi-
nated against males eighteen to twenty old. Id. at 204.
212. Id. at 209.
213. Id. at 206.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 205-06. The Court points out that the reason for the similarity in wording is
due to the framers' clear intention of placing the Commerce Clause framework established
by those statutes into the Constitution. Id.
216. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass "n involved a California statute
that required all wine producers and wholesalers to file fair trade contracts or price schedules
with the state. Id. at 99. The Court held that the California pricing system violated the
Sherman Act and that the Twenty-First Amendment does not prevent application of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 114.
217. Id. at 108. The Court noted that the determination of state powers under the Twenty-
First Amendment rested primarily on the language rather than the history behind it. Id. at
106-07 (citing Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 63-64).
218. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n, 445 U.S. at 108.
219. Id.
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uor distribution system." 220 The Court, however, added that states may es-
tablish other liquor regulations but that "those controls may be subject to the
federal commerce power.",
22 1
The Court next considered the Twenty-First Amendment in light of
Federal Communications Commission regulations in Capital Cities Cable,
Inc. v. Crisp.222 The Court considered the conflict of an Oklahoma statute
with the Federal Communications Commission regulations.223 The Court
held that the federal policies of regulating advertising outweighed the state
interests of preventing advertising of alcohol.224 The Court clarified the bal-
ancing test first hinted at in Craig and developed in California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass 'n.225 The states enjoy broad power under Section Two of the
Twenty-First Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicat-
ing liquor within their borders, but "the Amendment does not [allow] the
States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitu-
tion. '' 226 When a state regulation conflicts with federal law and does not
directly implicate the state's central power of regulation under the Twenty-
First Amendment, the balance between state and federal power tips in favor
of federal law.227
b. The Court creates the "core concerns" test
The balancing test of federal and state interest as it relates to federal
law foreshadowed the Court's shift in interpretation of the relationship be-
tween the Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause.228 This shift
in interpretation occurred in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,229 in which the
220. Id. at 110.
221. Id. While the Court may have unintentionally made this subtle distinction, it does
not change the fact that it exists. See id. The Court explicitly granted the states absolute
power over importation and distributing and stated that the Commerce power only comes
into play in other types of liquor regulation. Id.
222. 467 U.S. 691 (1984). Capital Cities Cable, Inc. involved the prohibition by the
Oklahoma Constitution and state statutes of advertising of alcoholic beverages. Id. at 695.
The Oklahoma Attorney General in 1980 advised that the retransmission of out-of-state
alcoholic beverage commercials on television systems operating in the state would be a vio-
lation of the ban. Id.
223. Id. at 698.
224. Id. at 716.
225. Id. at 712-13.
226. Id. at 712. (citing Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122 n.5 (1982); Cal. v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 115 (1972); Wis. v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971); Dep't of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.,
377 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1964)).
227. Id. at 716.
228. See Patterson, supra note 129, at 780.
229. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
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Court created the "core concerns" test.230 In that case, the Court, citing
23Hostetter,231 stated "that the [Twenty-First] Amendment did not entirely
remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Com-
merce Clause., 232 The Court stated that the central purpose of Section Two
"was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting bar-
riers to competition., 233 The Court effectively created a balancing test: the
federal interests implicated by the Commerce Clause and its negative impli-
cation, the Dormant Commerce Clause, against the state interests under the
Twenty-First Amendment.234 The Court stated the test as "whether the in-
terests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers
reserved by the Twenty-[F]irst Amendment that the regulation may prevail,
notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express federal
policies. 235
In Bacchus Imports, a Hawaii excise tax on alcohol was challenged as
facially discriminatory against out-of-state interests.236 The tax applied to
both in-state and out-of-state alcohol, but an exemption was available for
certain Hawaiian alcoholic beverages.237 The Court noted that the Hawaii
Legislature enacted these exemptions solely to protect and encourage devel-
opment of the Hawaiian liquor industry. 38 The state of Hawaii argued that
the Twenty-First Amendment gave the states power to enact these discrimi-
natory exemptions. 239 The Court first concluded that the tax scheme violated
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 240 The Court then addressed whether the
statute was "saved by the Twenty-[F]irst Amendment., 241 To make this
determination, the Court found that the Dormant Commerce Clause protects
federal interests in preventing economic "[b]alkanization." 242 The state side
of this balancing test focused on the state's purpose of protecting and pro-
230. Id. at 275-76.
231. 377 U.S. 324 (1964). In Hostetter, the Court stated that in-state sales of intoxicating
liquor intended to be used only in foreign countries could be made under the supervision of
the Federal Bureau of Customs. Id. at 333-34. The state regulation was not aimed at prevent-
ing unlawful use of alcoholic beverages within the state, but rather was designed "totally to
prevent transactions carried on under the aegis of a law passed by Congress in the exercise of
its explicit power under the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations." Id.
232. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 275.
233. Id. at 276.
234. Id.
235. id. (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc., 467 U.S. at 714).
236. Id. at 265.
237. Id.
238. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 265.
239. Id. at 274.
240. Id. at 273.
241. Id. at 274-76.
242. Id. at 276.
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moting the local liquor industry.243 The Court found that the balance should
shift to the federal interests in this type of case because economic protec-
tionism is not a "core concern" of the Twenty-First Amendment. 2"
The Court's narrowing of state power under the Twenty-First Amend-
ment continued in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority.245 The problem with New York's law in Brown-Forman was the
246control of liquor prices in other states. In that case, the Court conceded
that the Twenty-First Amendment "gives the states wide latitude to regulate
the importation and distribution of liquor within their territories," but that
this power does not include the ability to regulate sales in other states.247
The Court considered the same issue in Healy v. Beer Institute248 and once
again held that the Twenty-First Amendment did not "immunize state stat-
utes from invalidation under the Commerce Clause [if the] laws have the
practical effect of regulating sales in other states. 249
By the time the Court decided Healy, all that remained was a concrete
definition of a "core concern" of the Twenty-First Amendment that will
"save the statute" under a Bacchus Imports analysis.25° In North Dakota v.
United States,251 the Court upheld a North Dakota regulation because the
regulation was enacted "[i]n the interest of promoting temperance, ensuing
orderly market conditions and raising revenue., 252 The narrow construction
of the Twenty-First Amendment left the states with the power to enact regu-
lations concerning the importation of alcohol as long as the regulations sat-
isfied the language in North Dakota.253
243. Id. at 271.
244. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276.
245. 476 U.S. 573 (1986). In Brown-Forman, a New York law required every liquor
distiller or producer selling to wholesalers within the state to affirm that the prices it charged
were no higher than the lowest price at which the same product would be sold in any other
state during a particular month. Id. at 575-76.
246. Id.
247. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 1170.
248. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
249. Id. at 342-43. Healy involved a Connecticut statute requiring out of state beer ship-
pers to affirm that their posted prices for products sold to Connecticut wholesalers were no
higher than the prices at which those same products were sold in states bordering Connecti-
cut. Id. at 324.
250. See generally Miller, supra note 99, at 2544.
251. 495 U.S. 423 (1990). North Dakota involved a state regulation which required out-
of-state liquor delivered to Air Force bases to be labeled and reported. Id. at 426.
252. Id. at 432. Nevertheless, the opinion was only a plurality opinion, and a review of
the Congressional Record reveals limited history, if any at all, that these were considered
"core concerns" when the Twenty-First Amendment was ratified. See 76 CONG. REc. 4171
(1933).
253. TRIBE, supra note 86, at 1169.
[Vol. 28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
c. Recent Federal Legislation
Congress recently weighed in regarding the direct shipment issue by
proposing the Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement Act.254 The Act failed
to clearly yield direct power to the states over alcohol. 55 Instead, the Act
provided a federal forum for state attorneys general to seek injunctive relief
against those violating state laws respecting importation or transportation of
liquor.256 Also, President George W. Bush recently signed legislation allow-
ing the direct shipment of wine to a consumer during periods of heightened
security if the consumer possessed the ability to directly carry the wine from
the vineyard.5 7 Nevertheless, the federal government's involvement sug-
gests a potential conflict for any future federal legislation on direct shipment
that could create an issue between a state's power under the Twenty-First
Amendment and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.258
IV. REASONING
This section will trace in detail the reasoning of the Court in Granholm
that led it to decide that both the New York and Michigan statutes were
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court decided Granholm by first deciding
that the New York and Michigan statutes discriminated against interstate
commerce.25 9 Next, the Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment failed
to save the discrimination.260 The Court discussed the history of state liquor
regulations prior to the Twenty-First Amendment, the early history of the
Twenty-First Amendment, and the modem Twenty-First Amendment
cases.2 6 1 Then, the Court further decided that New York and Michigan ad-
vanced legitimate local purposes with the direct shipment statutes but that
these purposes could be served by reasonable, nondiscriminatory altema-
254. Douglass, supra note 63, at 1654; see 27 U.S.C.A. 122a (West Supp. 2005).
255. 27 U.S.C. 122a(e)(2)(2000). See also Tracy Shimer Garman, Comment, These
Grapes Are Ripe for Pickin': A Respectful Limit on State Power to Regulate Importation of
Wine Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 57 SMU L. REv. 1555, 1569 (2004).
256. 27 U.S.C.A. 122a(b) (West Supp. 2005). See Garman, supra note 255, at 1569.
257. Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 27 U.S.C. § 124(a)(1), (5)
(West Supp. 2005). The Act also requires that the purchaser of the wine "provided the win-
ery verification of legal age to purchase alcohol;" "the shipping container in which the wine
is shipped is marked to require an adult's signature upon delivery;" and "the wine is for
personal use only" and "not for resale." 27 U.S.C. § 124(a)(2)-(4) (Supp. 2002); see Garman,
supra note 250, at 1569.
258. Garman, supra note 255, at 1572.
259. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.1-2.
260. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
261. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1-3.
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tives. 262 Thus, the Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment does not
grant states the power to avoid the Dormant Commerce Clause.263
A. The New York and Michigan Statutes Discriminate Against Interstate
Commerce
1. Michigan's System
The Michigan distribution system allowed "in-state wineries to ship di-
rectly to consumers, subject only to a licensing requirement." 264 Meanwhile,
out-of-state wineries were completely banned from direct shipping. 265 The
system also required all out-of-state wine to pass through an in-state whole-
saler and retailer before reaching the consumer while allowing in-state wine
to bypass this restriction. 266 The extra steps required for out-of-state wine
267increased the cost of out-of-state wines. The difference in cost, and some-
times the inability to secure an in-state wholesaler due to low production,
could result in preventing small wineries from accessing the Michigan wine
market.268
2. New York's System
The three-tiered system in New York did not ban direct shipments out-
right.269 The New York system required the out-of-state winery to establish
a distribution operation in New York to directly ship to consumers.27 ° In-
state wineries could obtain a license to ship directly to consumers.2 7' Out-
of-state wineries, however, had to establish a distribution operation in New
York to obtain a license, and this extra step increased the cost of their
wine.2 72 The Court noted that the cost of establishing a "bricks-and-mortar"
distribution operation is cost prohibitive in one state much less all fifty
states.273 The Court concluded that New York's requirement was contrary to
262. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
263. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
264. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1896.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1896.
271. Id. at 1896-97.
272. Id. at 1897.
273. Id. The Court found that "[i]t comes as no surprise that not a single out-of-state
winery has availed itself of New York's direct-shipping privilege." Id. The Court noted that
no out-of-state winery has run the gauntlet of New York's regulatory scheme to gain access
to the market. Id at 1896.
[Vol. 28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the idea that an out-of-state firm be required "to become a resident in order
to compete on equal terms., 274 The Court also acknowledged that New York
discriminated against out-of-state wineries in other functions, such as "farm
winery" licenses. 275 The Court had no difficulty in finding the New York
regulations discriminated against interstate commerce.2 76
B. The Twenty-First Amendment Did Not Save the Discrimination
1. The History of State Liquor Regulations Prior to the Twenty-First
Amendment
The Court discussed the history of state liquor regulations prior to the
enactment of the Twenty-First Amendment. 277 The early case law, the Wil-
son Act, and the Webb-Kenyon Act were included in this historical ac-
count.278 The Court concluded that the Webb-Kenyon Act failed to repeal
the Wilson Act and that the Wilson Act did not allow states to discriminate
against out-of-state goods.279 Thus, the Court decided that, in order for
states to discriminate against out-of-state goods, Congressional repeal of the
Wilson Act was the first step.280 The Court noted that the Wilson Act reaf-
firmed, and the Webb-Kenyon Act did not displace, the Court's early case
law that required states to regulate domestic and imported liquor equally.28'
2. The Early History of the Twenty-First Amendment
The Court next considered the case law construing the Twenty-First
Amendment.28 2 The Court concluded that the words of Section Two "re-
stored to the states powers they had under the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon
Acts"283 and did not grant states power to discriminate against out-of-state
goods.284 Section Two's purpose "was to allow states to maintain an effec-
274. Id. at 1897 (citing Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64
(1963)).
275. Id. at 1897. A farm winery license allows for the most direct shipping to New York
consumers. Id. Out-of-state wineries are only eligible for a commercial winery license. Id.
Commercial wineries must obtain a separate certificate from the state allowing direct ship-
ments, which, if the winery is from another state, requires a distribution operation to be set
up in New York. Id.
276. Graholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1897.
277. Id. at 1899-1902.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1901.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1901-02.
282. Graholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1902.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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tive and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transporta-
tion, importation, and use. 285 Section Two denied states the authority to
pass non-uniform laws to discriminate against out-of state goods.286
After deciding the purpose of Section Two of the Amendment, the
Court proceeded to the early cases in which the Court had interpreted the
Amendment.287 The Court found that these early cases were inconsistent
with the current view put forth by the Court and failed to take a full account
of the history behind the Amendment. 288 These early cases reaffirmed the
broad grant of power to the states under Section Two.289 The Court recog-
nized that Young's Market2 90 did not even concern a question of discrimina-
tion prohibited by the Commerce Clause.29' Also, the earlier Court declined
to examine the underlying history of the Twenty-First Amendment.292 The
Court then proceeded to the modem case law.293
3. The Modern Twenty-First Amendment Cases
Previous decisions of the Court affirmed that the Twenty-First
Amendment did not save "state laws that violated other provisions of the
Constitution. 294 The Court in Granholm stated that Section Two did not
abrogate Congress's commerce powers over liquor.295 Finally, the Court
noted the modem case law in which "the Court [] held that state regulation
of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce
Clause. 296 The Court decided the final area of the modem case law as the
most relevant to the Michigan and New York direct shipment regulatory
systems.297
The Court, in light of the nondiscrimination principle, focused on Bac-
chus Imports.29 8 According to the Court, Bacchus Imports "foreclose[d] any
contention that [Section] Two of the Twenty-[F]irst Amendment immunizes
285. Id. at 1902.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Graholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1902.
289. Id.
290. 299 U.S. 59 (1936); see discussion supra Part III.D.1. and notes accompanying.
291. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1903.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. The Court cited and discussed the modem cases, which included Craig, 429 U.S.
190; Capital Cities Cable Inc., 467 U.S. 691; Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass 'n, 445 U.S. 97;
and Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. 263. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1903-04.
297. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1904.
298. Id.
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discriminatory direct-shipment laws from Commerce Clause scrutiny. '299
The purpose of the Twenty-First Amendment "was not to empower States to
favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition."300 The
Court declined the invitation to either overrule or limit Bacchus Imports. °1
Furthermore, the Court felt that to retreat from Bacchus Imports would un-
dermine Brown-Forman and Healy, both of which invalidated state liquor
regulations under Commerce Clause principles.0 2 The Court held that the
Twenty-First Amendment protects only state policies that treat liquor pro-
duced out-of-state the same as liquor produced in-state. 30 3 The New York
and Michigan laws were straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of
local producers. 3°
The Court dismissed the idea that its holding might undermine the
three-tiered system of regulating the distribution of alcohol used by most
states.305 Instead, the Court pointed out that the Twenty-First Amendment
accords states "virtually complete control over whether to permit importa-
tion or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.
30 6
If a state were to ban the sale of alcohol, the state would thereby be permit-
ted to ban its importation.30 7 The Court pointed out that the state would have
to ban the importation in order to effectuate its laws.308 The Court reempha-
sized its decision in North Dakota v. United States, which upheld the three-
tiered system as "unquestionably legitimate.
'
"
30 9
C. The Court Held that the Twenty-First Amendment Does Not Grant
States the Power to Avoid the Dormant Commerce Clause
The states offered two purposes for direct shipment regulations: pre-
venting access to alcohol to minors and tax collection.310 The Court found
that the states lacked sufficient evidence to show that the direct shipment of
299. Id.
300. Id. (quoting Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276).
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276).
303. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1904-05.
306. Id. at 1905. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n, 445 U.S. at 110).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 485 U.S. 423,
432 (1986)).
310. Id. at 1905. The other state justifications were "including facilitating orderly market
conditions, protecting public health and safety, and ensuring regulatory accountability." Id. at
1907. These objectives could be achieved through an evenhanded licensing requirement. Id.
at 1907.
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wine would increase consumption by minors.31 1 Also, the Court concluded
that, even if the states could show evidence of an increase, restricting only
out-of-state direct shipments would not sufficiently ameliorate the prob-
lem. 312 Thus, the Court held that preventing access by minors was not a
sufficient reason for the regulatory prohibition on direct shipment.1 3 In-
stead, the state could utilize less restrictive alternatives to curb access by
minors, such as using the Model Direct Shipping Bill. 314
Next, the Court dealt with the states' tax collection argument, which
was also found to be insufficient. 315 The Court observed that Michigan did
not rely upon wholesalers to collect taxes.316 It further noted that the alterna-
tives available, such as licensing and self-reporting, should be sufficient for
direct shipment. 3 7 As for New York, the Court explained that the state
could require a permit for direct shipment of wine by out-of-state wineries
just as it does for in-state wineries as an alternative.31 8 The Court also con-
cluded that the federal regulations of alcohol, such as the loss of a federal
license to operate issued by the Tax and Trade Bureau, would assist the
states in tax collection.31 9
The Court decided that the states' power under the Twenty-First
Amendment is broad.320 Nevertheless, this power does not include the
power to "ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of state wine
while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers." 321
The Dormant Commerce Clause requires more than mere speculation to
support discrimination against out-of-state goods.322 The burden is on the
state to show that the discrimination was demonstrably justified, which New
York and Michigan failed to do in Granholm.323
311. Id. at 1905.
312. Id. at 1905-06.
313. Id. at 1905.
314. Id. at 1906. The Model Direct Shipping Bill was developed by the National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures. Id. The Model Bill requires an adult signature upon delivery and a
label on the package instructing to obtain an adult signature. Id.
315. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1906.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. ld.
320. Id. at 1907.
321. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1907.
322. See id.
323. Id
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V. SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of the Court's decision in Granholm can be divided
into two categories: (1) the Court's faulty decision placing state alcohol
regulations under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis despite the history
surrounding the Twenty-First Amendment 324 and (2) the impact of the
Court's decision regarding the economics of wine sales, the future of the
three-tiered system, and the remaining options available to the states, in-
cluding Arkansas.325
A. The Twenty-First Amendment Does Not Grant States the Power to
Avoid the Dormant Commerce Clause Under Granholm
The Twenty-First Amendment granted states broad power over the
regulation of alcohol.326 Granholm ignores that grant and restores liquor
regulation to a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.327 A state must now
satisfy the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in regulating
direct shipments of alcohol, despite the legislative history of the Twenty-
First Amendment suggesting alcohol be removed from Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis.328 The Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the
Twenty-First Amendment, the Webb-Kenyon Act, and the Wilson Act un-
dermines the legal precedent the Court establishes in Granholm.329 Begin-
ning with Hostetter and Craig, the Court began chipping away at state
power under the Twenty-First Amendment as it related to provisions other
than the Commerce Clause. 330 The Court did not apply Dormant Commerce
Clause principles to state regulation of alcohol until Bacchus Imports.33I
The decision in Granholm restricts state power further than the Court's
decision in Bacchus Imports.332 Recall that in Bacchus Imports the Court
left open the chance for the state regulation to be "saved by the Twenty-
First Amendment." 333 The chance for salvation was determined based upon
324. See discussion infra Part V.A.
325. See discussion infra Parts V.B.1-2.
326. See discussion supra Part III.D. 1.
327. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
328. See discussion supra Part IV.C. For a discussion of the legislative history see supra
Part III.C.
329. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1910 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas questioned
the history of the majority's opinion and argued that the Court rejected such a historical
account in Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 64. Id.
330. See discussion supra Part III.D.2.a.
331. See discussion supra Part III.D.2.b.
332. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
333. See discussion supra Part III.D.2.b.
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the "core concerns" test established under Bacchus Imports.33 4 The "core
concerns" of the Twenty-First Amendment, according to the Court in North
Dakota, included "temperance, orderly market conditions and revenue., 335
In Granholm, the Court foreclosed the option of salvation by the Twenty-
First Amendment when the state seeks to employ the reasons of collection
of tax revenue and protection of minors. 336 Even if the state uses these two
reasons, the regulations will still remain subject to a Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis.337 Furthermore, the regulations will then fail under the
Dormant Commerce Clause if they discriminate unevenly between out-of-
state and in-state wineries. 338 The Twenty-First Amendment was designed
to allow states to regulate alcohol without the constraints of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.339
While the decision results in a favorable policy for wine connoisseurs
and small wineries, the Court should not rewrite the Twenty-First Amend-
ment on its own. Even though Craig and Hostetter stated that the Com-
merce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment are to be read as part of the
same Constitution, the Court did not decide that principle. 340 In fact that
principle was merely dicta as neither case involved the Commerce Clause
and the Twenty-First Amendment. 34' The Court's interpretation in Gran-
holm creates the problem Justice Brandeis warned against: not a construc-
tion but a re-writing of the Amendment.342 The Legislature writes the laws,
not the Court. If the Court's desire was to return alcohol to a Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, then a Constitutional Amendment repealing the
Twenty-First Amendment is appropriate.343
B. The Impact of the Court's Decision
1. Wineconomics
Economically, the decision might boost direct sales figures for alcohol.
In Granholm v. Heald, the alcohol involved was wine. Wine, including
chardonnays, merlots, pinot noirs, cabernet sauvignons, and many others,
334. See discussion supra Part III.D.2.b.
335. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423,432 (1990).
336. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
337. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
338. See discussion supra Part III.B.
339. See discussion supra Part III.C.
340. See discussion supra Part III.D.2.a.
341. See discussion supra Part III.D.2.a.
342. See discussion supra Part III.D. I; see also Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 62.
343. It is possible that congressional legislation may be prevented by the Twenty-First
Amendment itself; thus, only a Constitutional Amendment can alter the relationship of alco-
hol regulations and dormant Commerce Clause implication.
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vary throughout the country, and a wine's qualities are as distinct as the
region where it is produced. Yet, despite all the differences, one thing re-
mains common to each: the public's desire. Wine sales alone account for
over 18 billion dollars in sales in this country, while direct sales amount to
about 350 million dollars. 344 Despite this 350 million dollar figure, the di-
rect sales portion could potentially grow larger after the Court's decision in
Granholm.
The Court's decision opens more markets to small wineries. This
might enable these small wineries to earn greater profits and expand their
business. The benefits of a larger market, however, bring about conse-
quences. One potential effect on the wine market will be the rise in the
number of competitors. 345 The competition, as a result of freedom of access
to markets, might cause a consolidation effect on small wineries, thus result-
ing in a survival-of-the-fittest effect. This freedom of competition might
benefit wine consumers.
2. States' Dilemma: Ban All Direct Shipment, Allow Everyone Access
or Possibly Lose the Three-Tiered System
This section will first explain generally the options facing the states
346following the Court's decision in Granholm. Next, the section will focus
on a possible challenge to the three-tiered system as applied to wholesal-
ers. 347 Finally, this section will discuss options specifically available to Ar-
kansas following Granholm.34
a. Two options available to the states regarding direct ship-
ments following Granholm
The States face two choices: ban direct shipment for both in-state and
out-of-state alcohol or allow in-state and out-of-state direct shipments on
equal terms. Granholm does not mandate that States permit direct ship-
ments; it merely requires that the states apply the same rules to out-of-state
direct shipments if in-state direct shipments are allowed by the states.349 The
344. Linda Greenhouse, Court Liis Ban on Wine Shipping, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at
Al. The number of wine sales has been reported as high as 21.6 billion. Tom Ramstack,
Limits on Sales of Wine Rejected Top Court Hits Interstate Bans, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), May
17, 2005, at A01.
345. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 378 (6th ed., Aspen Publish-
ers 2003). Posner argues that "the removal of comprehensive regulation exposes the regu-
lated firm to competition." Id.
346. See discussion infra Part V.B.2.a.
347. See discussion infra Part V.B.2.b.
348. See discussion infra Part V.B.2.c.
349. Eric Asimov, The Pour; The Wine Store Just Got Bigger, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
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Court's decision gives small winery owners, wine connoisseurs, and con-
sumers cause to rejoice.35° Yet, despite the cause to celebrate, the decision
causes the erosion of the states' power to prevent direct shipments. The
states retain the power to ban direct shipment altogether or allow it on equal
terms.
Banning direct shipment altogether would harm in-state wineries as
well as prevent access to out-of-state wineries. The elimination of a source
of tax revenue from the in-state wineries discourages the states from an out-
right ban of direct shipment. That is not to say this is not an option. A few
states already ban direct shipment outright to both in-state and out-of-state
producers.35' One solution available after Granholm is to create a licensing
requirement whereby both in-state and out-of-state alcohol producers obtain
a direct shipment license on the same terms. The state could regulate and
recover taxes from both the in-state and out-of-state producers, thereby in-
creasing tax revenue. In fact, the New York legislature began considering
legislation to comply with the Granholm decision in which direct shipment
would be allowed via the Internet.
352
b. Possible challenge available to the three-tiered system as ap-
plied to wholesalers
The Court's decision results in sound policy, but the rationale used
leaves the future of the three-tiered system in doubt.3 53 Justice Thomas, dis-
senting in Granholm, argued that acceptance of the three-tiered system sup-
ports the principle that the Twenty-First Amendment freed states from
Dormant Commerce Clause limitations.354 If the Twenty-First Amendment
does not allow states to escape Dormant Commerce Clause limitations on
discriminatory direct shipment laws affecting manufacturers, then the fol-
lowing question remains: Can the three-tiered system remain legitimate
when it discriminates against wholesalers? Thus, Justice Thomas's dis-
agreement provides insight into a future problem-the downfall of the
three-tiered system. The Court's distinction that there is a difference be-
tween discrimination against manufacturers and wholesalers does not fit
with Dormant Commerce Clause principles that existed prior to the Twenty-
2005, at F 10.
350. In Vino, Some Split Decision Veritas, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A20.
351. For the number of these states see discussion supra Part III.A.; see also Douglass,
supra note 62 (discussing a comprehensive listing and analysis of the different wine statutes).
352. Al Baker, Plan to Let New York Use Web for Out-of-State Wine Has Some Toasting,
but Others Stewing, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at B3.
353. See discussion supra Part V.B. 1.
354. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1921 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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First Amendment.355 Granholm holds that states may not discriminate
against out-of-state manufacturers without running afoul of the Dormant
Commerce Clause; therefore, out-of-state wholesalers are owed the same
protections. In fact, Justice Thomas warned that such discrimination against
out-of-state wholesalers risks constituting "economic protectionism.,
356
Liquor must pass through licensed in-state wholesalers under the three-
tiered system.357 The Court, in dicta, conceded that this scheme is within the
state's power under the Twenty-First Amendment. 358 Given the Court's
reasoning in Granholm, however, that direct shipment laws discriminating
against out-of-state manufacturers are unconstitutional, the discrimination
against out-of-state wholesalers under the three-tiered system appears ripe
for attack. The Court's reasoning in Granholm suggests that its strong lan-
guage in North Dakota that the three-tiered system is "unquestionably con-
stitutional" may no longer hold up. Manufacturers should attack the three-
tiered system as specifically unconstitutional as applied to them under the
Court's reasoning in Granholm. Either the Court must reverse Granholm to
uphold the three-tiered system or force states to no longer discriminate in
favor of in-state wholesalers. The removal of discriminatory laws against
wholesalers would provide similar benefits to the wine and alcohol market
as the benefits from the removal of discriminatory direct shipment laws.
359
c. Options specifically available to Arkansas following Gran-
holm
Arkansas' three-tiered distribution system, under the Court's decision
in Granholm, discriminates against out-of-state wineries. Particularly im-
portant for the State of Arkansas is the recent Act 1806 of 2005.360 The Act,
which allows wine to be shipped directly to in-state customers that visit
Arkansas wineries, discriminates against out-of-state wineries. There is no
provision for out-of-state wineries to have the same access to the consumers
of Arkansas.361 Thus, what happens if an Arkansas resident visits an out-of-
state winery and returns home to order a bottle from the out-of-state win-
ery? The Act does not provide an answer to our dilemma faced at the begin-
ning of this note. Yet, with the Court's decision in Granholm, the Act will
355. Id. at 1923.
356. Id. at 1924.
357. See discussion supra Part III.A.
358. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1904-05. Perhaps the Court failed to see the implications of
its holding in light of the discriminatory effect on wholesalers because that actual situation
was not before them.
359. See supra Part V.B.1.
360. See discussion supra Part III.A.
361. See2005 Ark. Acts 1806.
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not survive a Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry. The Act will not survive
because it discriminates against out-of-state wine producers for the benefit
of in-state wine producers. Thus, following Granholm, the law is unconsti-
tutional.
In order for the law to survive, Arkansas must show that the statute's
purpose is justifiable in light of the discriminatory effects and that there are
no other reasonably available, less discriminatory alternatives. The purpose
of protecting in-state wineries from competition or favoring the local wine
industry will not suffice. After Granholm, the protection of minors or the
ability to collect revenue will not protect the statute. Thus, Arkansas faces
the choice of either banning direct shipment entirely or allowing direct
shipment on equal terms to out-of-state wineries and in-state wineries. The
Legislature needs to amend the Act to either allow the same access for Ar-
kansas consumers who visit out-of-state wineries or repeal the in-state law.
This limitation by the Court on state power is precisely the outcome the
Twenty-First Amendment was designed to prevent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Commerce between states according to the Constitution falls under
congressional power. In the absence of an exercise of that power, the States
are left to regulate so long as the regulations are done on equal terms. Yet,
alcohol received special consideration following the Twenty-First Amend-
ment. The Supreme Court finally decided in Granholm that the Twenty-
First Amendment provides no such protection for state legislation that bla-
tantly constitutes economic protectionism for in-state interests. The Court's
decision results in sound policy and is favorable to the small wineries, wine
connoisseurs, and consumers. Nonetheless, the decision does not rest on
sound legal precedent, and it appears plausible that with a shift in members
of the Court, this decision could change. The legal framework and the future
of the three-tiered system following Granholm remains shaky at best. Thus,
offer a toast to the Supreme Court for the recent decision allowing the direct
shipment of wine, but beware the further restriction of a state's power that
the precedent creates.
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